[175] Despite the efforts of such notable thinkers as Sartre, Camus, and Ricoeur to affirm philosophically the being of evil, a systematic critique of the traditional metaphysical understanding of evil as privation of being has not yet been fully worked out. The task of this paper is to sketch out just such a critique and to suggest a more adequate philosophical reflection on the being of evil by turning to the thought of Heidegger. Part I examines Heidegger's commentary on Aristotle's remarks on steresis. Aristotle is our teacher, Heidegger argues, in learning -to hold on to the wonder‖ of the steresis-dimension of Being (physis), and, thus, to hold on to the wonder that -lack,‖ -loss,‖ -absence‖ -is. Part II considers Heidegger's recognition that the k-not at the very heart of our existence is yet much more complex. He turns to the fragments of Parmenides and Heraclitus to bring to light a dissembling-dimension of Being.
Introduction
Affirming the -reality‖ of evil has been a central concern of twentieth century reflection. Literature, film, painting, sculpture, music, psychology, and even physics have all attempted to take into account a disordered dimension of being. Heidegger, just such a critique may be sketched out and a more adequate philosophical reflection on the being of evil suggested.
Returning to Aristotle and the Notion of steresis
A discussion of the history of the development of the philosophical position that evil is intelligible only as a -lack‖ or -deficiency‖ of being lies beyond the scope of this paper. For our purposes, we need only note that it was principally Augustine who consolidated this position and moved it to the center of philosophical reflection.
Heidegger's difficulty with the traditional metaphysical position appears early on in Being and Time. In section 58, he observes that the classical metaphysical discussion of evil is rooted in a particular understanding of being. -Least of all,‖ he observes, -can we come any closer to the existential phenomenon of guilt by taking our orientation from the idea of evil, the malum as privatio boni. . . . Although he adds no further remarks, still, the main lines of his thinking emerge quite clearly: only with the de-construction of the traditional metaphysical understanding of being as presence-at-hand or constant presentness can the traditional understanding of evil as privation of being be decisively overcome and a more adequate understanding of evil worked out.
In the summer semester of 1936, Heidegger gave a lecture course at the University of Freiburg on Schelling's treatise On Human Freedom.
1 Schelling dealt at length with working out an understanding of the possibility of evil in the Ground of beings, and in his commentary, Heidegger praises Schelling for radically re-thinking the understanding of evil as the -lack‖ which is -non-being.‖ In Heidegger's view, Schelling boldly attempted to think the -being‖ of evil precisely as -lack‖ or -non-presence‖ [ST, In addition to morphe, hyle is integral to physis, the presencing process. Hyle (dynamis), according to Heidegger, characterizes the -not-yet‖ dimension of the presenting of a being. If morphe characterizes the fullness of becoming-present, hyle characterizes presencing precisely as incomplete, on the way, or -not-yet.‖ Yet, he appears to be careful to distinguish two different aspects of this dimension of -not-yetness.‖ On the one hand, it may be said that the full presencing of a being -leaves behind‖ all -not-yet-ness.‖ This characterizes -motion‖ in the narrow sense; that is, -motion‖ which has been traditionally opposed to -rest‖ [OBC, 257] .
On the other hand, though, it may be said that a being, even as it has become fully present, retains an aspect of -not-yet-ness.‖ In other words, even as a being -spends time‖ in the appearance, it -holds itself back and within itself‖ [OBC, 258] . Presence (morphe) always retains an hyletic dimension. As he puts it: -morphe and hyle in their inherent togetherness‖ [OBC, 254] . Thus, in both these senses, hyle characterizes an integral dimension of physis, Being, the presencing process. For Heidegger, hyle is -a mode of becoming-present;‖ that is, hyle -is‖ precisely as the presencing of -not-yet-ness‖ [OBC,
Finally, he notes that for Aristotle steresis, too, is an integral dimension of the presencing process (physis), and his commentary on this point brings us to the central concern of this paper. He highlights Aristotle's remark at 193b 20 that -he steresis eidos pos estin,‖ which is generally translated along the lines of -privation too is in a way form‖ [4, Vol. II]. Heidegger, reading as he does eidos as -appearance,‖ translates the line this way: -for privation too is something like appearance‖ [OBC, 264] . 4 And he understands Aristotle to be maintaining that privation, as a unique mode of becomingpresent, -is.‖ Yet precisely how steresis presences, precisely how steresis -is,‖ needs to be clarified, and Heidegger takes up this task.
He asks us to consider, for example, that when a blossom -buds forth, the leaves that prepared for the blossom fall off‖ [OBC, 266] . What presences to us is not simply the appearance of the blossom but also the loss or absence of the leaves. Similarly, he notes that -when the fruit comes to light, [and] the blossom disappears,‖ what presences to us is not only the appearance of the fruit, but also the lack or absence of the beautiful blossom [OBC, 266] . In general, then, every He uses another example drawn from everyday experience to underscore this point:
When we say today, for example, -My bicycle is gone!‖ we do not mean simply that it is somewhere else; we mean that it is missing. When something is missing, the missing thing is gone, to be sure, but the goneness itself, the lack itself, is what irritates and upsets us, and the -lack‖ can do this only if the lack itself is -there,‖ i.e., constitutes a mode of Being. Steresis as becoming-absent is not simply absentness, but rather is a becoming-present, the kind in which the becoming-absent becomes present. Steresis is eidos, but eidos pos, an appearance and becoming-present of sorts. [OBC, including the -taking away of something by force‖ [1] . 5 We might also note that in
Heidegger's example, he observes that the -lack‖ which presences -irritates and upsets‖ us. There is an existential dimension to his commentary which is not present-at least explicitly-in Aristotle's analysis in either the Physics or the Metaphysics.
[180] Yet, even with these qualifications in mind, we should not miss Heidegger's central point: For Aristotle, the notion of steresis, no less than the notions of morphe and hyle, is necessary to characterize the process of the presencing of beings. Aristotle is our teacher, Heidegger insists, in learning to -hold on to the wonder‖ of the steresisdimension of Being (physis) and, thus, to hold on to the wonder that the presencing of -lack,‖ -loss,‖ -absence‖ --is [OBC, 266] . In speaking about evil, Aquinas often cited the example of blindness. Blindness in an adult human being is the lack or privation of a good that ought to be present -sight.
According to Aquinas, such a privation is nothing existent in reality; it is not an ens reale: -In one sense, being (ens) signifies the entity of a thing, according as it is divided by the ten predicaments, and is thus convertible with thing. In this sense, no privation is a being, and therefore no evil either" [6, I, 48, 2, ad 2]. Indeed, privation is a kind of nonbeing: -Non-being, understood as simple negation, does not require a subject. Privation, however, is a negation in a subject . . . and evil is that kind of non-being‖ [6, I, 48, 3, ad
There is only one sense in which Aquinas allows that privation, and therefore evil, may be said to be -as a being of reason, an ens rations: -In another sense, being (ens) signifies the truth of a proposition which consists in composition whose mark is this word ‗is'. In this sense, being is what answers to the question, is it?, and thus we speak of blindness as being in the eye, or of any other privation being in its subject. In this way even evil can be called a being‖ [6 devastated. Yet what pains so? It is the -loss,‖ the -lack‖ itself, to re-work Heidegger's words, which so grieves this person, and the -lack‖ can do this only if the lack itself is -there,‖ that is, constitutes a mode of Being. Thus, this steresis surely a malum, is eidos, but eidos pos, an appearance and becoming-present of sorts.
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[182] In his commentary on Schelling's treatise, Heidegger addresses this very example: -As a lack, it is true that a lack is a not-being-present. Nevertheless, this absence is not nothing. The blind man who has lost his sight will argue vigorously against the statement that blindness is nothing existent and nothing depressing and nothing burdensome. Thus, nothingness is not nugatory; but, rather, something awesome, the most awesome aspect of the unfolding of Being‖ [ST, 101; slightly modified].
Consider another example. A friend has promised to pick me up at a certain hour so I may get to work. My friend, however, arrives a half-hour late, and I am late for work.
I relate this episode to a colleague, and she remarks that my friend -showed a lack of consideration.‖ Precisely so. And my friend's -showing‖ a -lack‖ of consideration annoyed and hurt me only because the becoming-present of -lack‖ constitutes a mode of
Being. Such a -lack‖ is.
Other examples could be cited, but I do not wish to lose sight of the central issue.
As important as affirming the -existential‖ reality of evil is, still, such testimony cannot be given its proper weight in philosophy until the traditional philosophical understanding of evil as lack of being is attacked at its metaphysical roots. At least indirectly, this
Heidegger has done by returning to Aristotle, and by virtue of this effort, philosophy in the present day can find its own voice in affirming the being of evil.
The Complexity of the K-not in Being
The philosophical task of reflecting on the being of evil is not yet complete, however, for, surely, our experience of evil is not confined solely to the experience of -lack‖ or -absence.‖ As William Barrett observed some time ago, it is Augustine himself who so vividly and chillingly described the human encounter with evil, not simply as an encounter with -lack,‖ but also as an encounter with a kind of positive malignancy, distortion, and twistedness [2, [96] [97] . 10 In part, Augustine remains such a fascinating figure precisely because he so passionately defended a philosophical position on evil which so pointedly belied his own poignant experience of the monstrous k-not in being. Every appearing is simultaneously a disguising of sorts; every appearing is in some way distorted, and this distortion is two-fold. First, that which appears also appears -as what it actually is not‖ [IM, 109] . Second, the presencing of -seeming-to-be,‖ which is intrinsic to every presencing, itself presences as hidden, cloaked, concealed [IM, 109] . Thus, the presencing of a two-fold distortedness, in addition to the presencing of -lack,‖ is an integral dimension of Being. As he puts it, a two-fold distortedness constitutes -a definite mode of emerging self-manifestation [and thus] belongs necessarily to Being‖ [IM, 109] .
He admits, then, that there is a sense in which Being may be said to deceive:
-Because appearance thus essentially distorts itself in its cloaking and dissembling, we rightly say that appearance deceives. This deception lies in the appearance itself‖ [IM, 109] . It is arguable that this dissembling-dimension of Being is the very condition of the possibility of the particularly cruel physical distortions and deviations which haunt this mortal realm. In the commentary on Schelling's treatise, Heidegger gives a phenomenological account of illness which speaks to this point -and which also inevitably calls to mind Augustine's descriptive accounts:
In the case of sickness, there is not just something lacking, but something wrong.
-Wrong‖ not in the sense of something only incorrect, but in the genuine sense of falsification, distortion, and reversal. This falsification is at the same time false in the sense of what is sly. We speak of malignant disease. Disease is not only [184] a disruption, but a reversal of the whole existence which takes over the total condition and dominates it. [ST, [143] [144] In IM, Heidegger more explicitly raises another consideration: he cites this dissembling-dimension of Being as a crucial condition of the possibility of all concrete instances of human going astray -including, presumably, human moral evil. He regrets, however, that we, unlike the earliest Greek thinkers, have ceased to -recognize‖ the -power‖ [IM, 109] of this k-not in Being which contributes to the k-notting of our judgment in matters both great and small. 11 We need not examine how he articulates a fundamentally similar position in other places in his work. Even so, it is worth noting that one of Heidegger's favorite approaches to this issue is by way of a discussion of a fragment of Heraclitus: physis kryptesthai philei. Even in his commentary on Aristotle, he concludes the discussion with a brief reflection on this fragment. -Being loves to hide itself,‖ he translates Heraclitus' words, and he understands Heraclitus to mean that Being has a -predilection‖ for -self-hiding.‖ Concealing, covering-over, disguising is an integral dimension of physis, Being, the presencing of beings. -And therefore,‖ he concludes,
-the kryptesthai of physis is not to be overcome [once and for all], not to be stripped from physis. Rather, the task [for thought] is the much more difficult one of allowing to physis, in all the purity of its becoming-present, the kryptesthai that belongs to it‖ [OBC, 269] .
Conclusion
Thus, for Heidegger, positive dissembling, in addition to the unfolding of -lack,‖ constitutes a mode of Being. No doubt, then, he does provide a way for us to begin to articulate philosophically our experience of the powerful and terrible reality of the distortions, deviations, and deceptions which permeate our lives and our world and which we recognize to be evil. But I emphasize that Heidegger offers us only a beginning because I am not sure that even his reflections on the dissembling-dimension of Being are adequate to the task of articulating philosophically the complexity of the k-not at the very heart of our existence. Yet, even so, what is clear is that by virtue of Heidegger's philosophical efforts, the philosophical scandal of understanding evil as a lack of [185]
being has been put to rest. We must now get on with the task of heeding Plato's advice:
-But if we will truly tell of the way in which the work [of the creation of the world] was accomplished, we must include the errant cause as well, and explain its influence‖ [Timaeus, 48b] .
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